Authorization Creep: How a Core Cybersecurity Concept Enables Systemic Overreach

In cybersecurity, 'authorization' is a precise, technical concept. It defines the specific permissions granted to a user, system, or process after authentication, forming the 'A' in the AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) framework and a cornerstone of Zero Trust. It is meant to be granular, auditable, and bound by the principle of least privilege. However, a disturbing trend is emerging: the migration of this term into broader corporate and governmental contexts, where it is used to cloak expansive power with a veneer of procedural legitimacy. This 'authorization creep' represents a significant governance and semantic risk, blurring critical lines for security professionals and the public alike.

The Technical Benchmark: Military-Grade Authorization
The recent authorization of Palantir's PFCS Forward platform by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) exemplifies the term in its intended, rigorous context. DISA granted authority to operate (ATO) at Impact Levels 5 and 6 (IL5/IL6), covering controlled but unclassified and classified data, respectively, for on-premises and edge deployments. This process involves exhaustive security assessments, control validation, and continuous monitoring. It is a high-stakes, technical authorization with clear parameters and oversight mechanisms—a model of what the term should entail.

Corporate Co-option: Share Buyback Authorizations
Contrast this with corporate announcements from Legrand and LiveRamp. Both companies secured 'authorizations' from their boards of directors for massive share repurchase programs—$200 million in LiveRamp's case. While a standard financial term, its use is telling. This 'authorization' transfers significant capital allocation power from broader shareholder oversight to the board and executives, often with limited ongoing disclosure requirements. It is a financial permission slip, framed with terminology that subconsciously borrows from more rigorous domains, potentially muting scrutiny.

Governmental Expansion: Eminent Domain and Immigration
The creep becomes more pronounced in the public sector. In Greensburg, Pennsylvania, local officials are considering using 'eminent domain' authority—a government authorization to seize private property for public use—for a flood control project. This power, while legal, is among the most intrusive state authorities, justified by a broad public 'authorization' that often leaves affected citizens with little recourse beyond compensation disputes.

Simultaneously, in Louisiana, the state Attorney General is criticizing the release of immigrants by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after they completed criminal sentences. The debate hinges on ICE's 'authority' to detain or release individuals. This highlights how authorization frameworks in immigration operate in a legal gray zone, where the 'authorization' to deprive liberty is subject to shifting policy interpretations and limited judicial review, far from the audit trails required in cybersecurity.

The Cybersecurity Governance Implications
For GRC (Governance, Risk, and Compliance) professionals, this trend is alarming. The dilution of 'authorization' weakens its conceptual integrity.

1. Erosion of Semantic Security: When the same term describes a meticulously logged API permission and the power to seize a home or detain a person, language becomes a tool for obfuscation, not clarity. This complicates public discourse and policy-making on digital rights.
2. Normalization of Overreach: The technical legitimacy of cybersecurity authorization can bleed into these other domains, making expansive corporate or state actions appear more routine, reviewed, and justified than they may be. A 'board-authorized' buyback sounds definitive, much like a 'DISA-authorized' platform.
3. Accountability Evasion: Technical authorization is designed for accountability (the third 'A' in AAA). These other forms often lack equivalent robust audit trails, transparent decision criteria, or effective challenge mechanisms. The term provides a false sense of due process.
4. Risk to Public Trust: The cybersecurity industry relies on public trust in concepts like secure authorization. When the public sees 'authorization' used to justify controversial corporate or state actions, it risks breeding cynicism that could spill over into distrust of essential digital security measures.

The Path Forward: Reclaiming Precision
The cybersecurity community must advocate for precision in language as a component of good governance.

• Internal Advocacy: GRC teams should highlight this semantic creep in risk reports, noting how blurred terminology can mask operational and reputational risks.
• Public Education: Professionals can help distinguish between technical authorization (specific, auditable, least-privilege) and broad statutory or corporate authority.
• Policy Engagement: Supporting legal and regulatory frameworks that demand transparency and accountability for all significant 'authorizations,' whether in code or in law, can help bridge the gap.

The goal is not to reclaim exclusive use of the word but to insist that any process bearing the name meets minimum standards of transparency, specificity, and accountability. The 'authorization creep' reveals a systemic vulnerability not in our code, but in our governance. By applying the rigorous mindset of cybersecurity to the term itself, we can help check the overreach it is increasingly being used to enable.